If any state has a premium crisis, Massachusetts should, yet premiums were lower in 2005 than in 1990 for nearly all physicians.
T h e m o s t di s c us se d malpractice reform proposal would limit compensation for patients injured as a result of negligence. Its proponents claim that the law should require caps because malpractice premiums represent a large part of practice costs, increase steadily, are higher today than ever, and threaten the viability of medical practice.
The cost of malpractice insurance is rarely studied carefully. 1 The best studies-conducted by the American Medical Association (AMA) from 1970 to 2000-suggest that there is no premium crisis. 2 Mean premiums nationally, regionally, and for high-risk specialties peaked around 1986, declined until 1996, and were still below 1986 levels in 2000, when AMA surveys ended. In constant 2005 dollars, mean premiums in 2000 for all physicians were $20,868; for obstetrics/gynecology (OB/GYN), $44,458. Premiums were 7 percent of practice costs for all physicians and 12.7 percent for OB/GYN. Having the highest premiums didn't threaten OB/GYN viability. At $275,484, its mean net practice income was nearly $15,000 higher than mean income for all physicians. 3 The AMA studies, however, don't report premiums since 2000; also, national and regional averages could hide premium crises in states without liability caps. We studied premiums from 1975 to 2005 in a state without caps to test whether it supports the prediction of premium crises in such states or reflects patterns in AMA national data. dence, if individual states have premium crises, Massachusetts should. Malpractice premiums reflect award size and frequency. National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) statistics from 2000 to 2005 suggest that Massachusetts premiums are high. Among fifty-one jurisdictions, its median settlement payment ($187,000) ranked fourth, and its mean payment ($329,000) ranked sixth. At 4.34 payments per 100,000 people, it ranked twenty-fourth but had less than one fewer payment per 100,000 than the ninth-ranked state. 4 Only Washington, D.C., and Connecticut had both higher mean payment size and higher frequency. The AMA lists Massachusetts among twenty-one states with a malpractice crisis. 5 Massachusetts has a soft $500,000 settlement cap that allows broad exceptions. 6 The Massachusetts Medical Society says that this is "woefully inadequate" and has not stabilized the market. 7 The Massachusetts malpractice insurance market today includes (1) a state-regulated mutual insurer, the Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Company, known as Pro-Mutual (the "Insurer"), which supplied our data; (2) other state-regulated insurers; (3) the Control led R isk Insurance Company (CRICO) for Harvard Medical School-affiliated physicians; and (4) risk-retention groups and offshore insurers.
In 1975, commercial malpractice insurers exited Massachusetts, and the legislature created the Massachusetts Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (MMJUA). The legislature converted it to ProMutual in 1995. Around the time of the formation of the MMJUA, Harvard-affiliated hospitals created CRICO for malpractice insurance.
Since their creation, CRICO and the MMJUA/ProMutual have controlled approximately 90 percent of the physicians' liability insurance market, each covering about half. AM Best reports that in 2005, the Insurer covered 77 percent of regulated professional liability insurance, which includes other medical professionals and institutions. 8 The Insurer estimates that it covers 88-91 percent of regulated physician liability insurance and 40-50 percent of all physician liability insurance. n Liability insurance policies. Insurers set rates based on the time period covered, dollar amount of protection, and risk of loss.
Time period. Policies cover either periods when alleged negligence occurs, regardless of when claims are filed-called occurrence policies-or periods during which patients file negligence claims-called claims-made policies. Physicians renewing a claims-made policy are covered from the first year they owned the policy. Premiums are higher for second-, third-, and fourth-year claims-made policies because they cover a longer time period. Insurers also sell mature claims-made policies that cover five or more years of past practice. Occurrence policies cost more than firstthrough fourth-year claims-made policies and less than mature claims-made policies. The costs of insurance through claims-made and occurrence policies generally converge over time because physicians who do not renew a claims-made policy need to purchase so-called tail insurance for claims filed later.
Dollar amount of protection. Policies specify a maximum amount reimbursed both per claim and yearly. A typical policy covers up to $1 million per claim, capped at $3 million yearly (known as $1/$3 million coverage).
Risk of loss. Insurers calculate each specialty's average risk of loss and assign it to a premium rate group. In 2005, the Insurer had nineteen rate groups. Insurers can further refine individual physicians' risk based on their claims history, length of time in practice, work setting, organizational affiliation, and other factors.
n Inflation adjustment. We express all data in constant 2005 dollars adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), rather than for medical inflation as some scholars do. 9 Medical inflation is twice CPI, so the premium increases we report are much greater than if we adjusted for medical inflation.
Malpractice awards compensate for medical expenses (appropriately adjusted by medical inflation) and nonmedical expenses, lost income, and pain and suffering (best adjusted using CPI). The most accurate premium adjustment would combine the two, weighted toward the CPI. We used the CPI because our study is a test case to identify the highest premiums by choosing a state with top settlement payments. Thus, we preferred to overstate premium increases. Furthermore, policy debate focuses on how premiums affect practice costs, which AMA surveys indicate include mainly nonmedical items (nonphysician personnel, rent, utilities, and office expenses). 10 Adjusting by CPI facilitates comparing premium and other practice cost increases.
Occurrence Policies: 1975-2005
n Mean manual rates and mean premiums by tiers. We report mean rates for all physicians and mean premiums for practice specialties grouped into five tiers from 1975 to 2005, for $1/$3 million and $2/$6 million occurrence policies. This accounted for 83 percent of all policies in 2005.
In 2005, Tier 5 included 78 percent of physicians and had the lowest premiums. Tier 4 had 8 percent of physicians and the second lowest premiums. Tier 3 comprised 5 percent of physicians: those who performed major general, abdominal, thoracic, plastic, gynecological, cardiac, or hand surgery and emergency medi-cine. Tier 2 represented 4 percent of physicians: those performing major vascular, cardiovascular, head and neck, traumatic, and orthopedic (except spinal) surgery. Tier 1 included 4 percent of physicians: obstetrics and OB/GYN, orthopedics performing spinal surgery, and major neurological surgery.
Exhibit 1 displays $1/$3 million occurrence manual rates. Mean rates for all physicians grew only slightly over thirty years, with cycles of rises and falls. But rates for physicians in Tiers 1-3 were much higher than for most physicians, especially at their peaks. Tiers 3 and 2 rates soared from 1980 to 1990, declined until 1995 or 2000, increased thereafter, but in 2005 were lower than in 1990. Only Tier 1 rates were much higher in 2005 than in 1990.
Exhibit 2 displays mean premiums for each tier weighed by the number of physicians from each rate group within the tier. The Insurer lacked data on the number of physicians in each rate group before 1990. Mean premiums for $1/$3 million coverage for all physicians de- n Distribution of physicians by manual rates. Exhibit 3 displays the distribution of physicians by manual rates at $10,000 increments from 1990 to 2005. In 2005, 29 percent of physicians with $1/$3 million coverage had rates below $10,000; 78 percent, $20,000 or less; and 92 percent, under $40,000. Four percent had rates over $50,000. Between 1990 and 2005, those with rates under $20,000 increased from 72 percent to 78 percent. Within this group, physicians moved into higher premium levels. Those with high rates-more than $60,000-decreased from 8 percent to 4 percent. Those with rates higher than $70,000 increased from 0 percent to 4 percent. Those in the middle range-$20,000-$60,000-decreased from 20 percent to 17 percent. Within the group, physicians moved to the middle.
In 2005, 23 percent of physicians with $2/$6 million coverage had rates under $10,000; 63 percent, under $20,000; and 95 percent, under $40,000. Only 5 percent of physicians had rates higher than $40,000; only 1 percent, higher than $60,000. From 1990 to 2005, the highest rate group shrank, and the lowest rate group expanded.
n Discounts and surcharges. Starting in 1990, the Insurer discounted premiums for some physicians. In 2000 it increased discount frequency and size, and it surcharged some physicians. In 2005 the Insurer discounted as follows: interns, residents, and fellows working in a facility insured by the Insurer: 25 percent or 15 percent; physicians in first-and second-year practice, 50 percent and 25 percent; physicians in academic settings or community service treating patients twenty-one hours a week or less, 50 percent; emergency 8 medicine physicians, up to 20 percent; and physicians covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act, between 25 and 50 percent. The Insurer reduced premiums additionally up to 25 percent for physicians deemed at low risk and surcharged physicians deemed at high risk up to 25 percent. Physicians with no closed claims over $10,000 received discounts of 3-15 percent, based on duration of clean claims. Group practices with a favorable claims history also received discounts.
By 2005, 88.7 percent of policies were discounted, and 6 percent were surcharged. Sixty-five percent of physicians received discounts of 0-25 percent; 23.6 percent, discounts of 25-50 percent. Four-and-a-half percent paid surcharges less than 25 percent; 1.4 percent, surcharges over 25 percent. Adjusting Tier 1's premiums for discounts and surcharges, physicians paying more than $70,000 fell from 4 percent to 2.7 percent; 1.1 percent paid $60,000-70,000; and 0.1 percent paid $50,000-$60,000.
In 2005, 66.7 percent of all $1/$3 million occurrence policies were discounted more than 12 percent. Reducing 2005 rates by just over 12 percent for Tier 5 and by only 5 percent for Tier 4 results in lower premiums than in 1990. Thus, premiums for most physicians in Tiers 4 and 5 were lower in 2005 than in 1990. Mean rates for Tiers 2 and 3 were lower in 2005 than in 1990, even before adjusting for discounts and surcharges, but Tier 1 had a higher mean premium in 2005 than in 1990, even after adjusting for its average discount of $11,014. Exhibit 4 and Supplemental Exhibit 1 reveal premium variations. 11 In 2005, premiums for Tier 1 physicians with $1/ $3 million coverage varied widely. The OB/ GYN manual rate was $97,243, approximately $8,700 more than its 1990 level, but premiums ranged between $48,622 and $145,865. Few Tier 1 physicians Nearly all obstetrician/gynecologists with $2/ $6 million coverage paid the manual rate; more paid surcharges than received discounts. n Focus on obstetrics. Since 1990, the highest rates were for OB/GYN. We supplemented OB/GYN occurrence data with claimsmade data (Exhibit 5 and Supplemental Exhibit 2). 12 In 2000, OB/GYN occurrence rates were $69,361, about $275 more than 1990 rates. However, because of discounts and surcharges, 88 percent paid less than in 1990. Claims-made premiums reveal similar patterns: mean weighted premiums were lower than in 1990. By 2005, only 3 percent of obstetrician/gynecologists with occurrence policies paid the manual rate, $97,243; 29 percent paid less than the 1990 rate. Between 53 percent and 76.2 percent of obstetrician/gynecologists purchasing first-through fourth-year claimsmade policies received discounts, yet most paid more than 1990 rates. Premiums varied greatly; the highest were more than twice the lowest.
n Changes in policies purchased. In 1987 the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine required that physicians purchase at least $1/$3 million coverage. 13 Hospitals can require greater coverage for physicians to receive practice privileges. Since 1990, many physicians increased coverage limits, and thus paid more. Physicians purchasing $1/$3 mil- 8 15 Occurrence policies in 2005 cost $3,473 more than first-year claims-made coverage for rate group 1, and $65,740 more for rate group 19. Mature claims-made premiums were $375 more than for occurrence in rate group 1 and rose to $7,763 more in rate group 19. n Other Massachusetts insurers. Does the Insurer reject high-risk physicians or insure a smaller share of them than the state average? Massachusetts regulations prohibit insurers from refusing any applicant. However, insurers can cede risk and insurance premiums for any policyholder they do not wish to cover to a state-mandated reinsurance program. The program divides these costs among insurers based on their market share. ProMutual has 88-91 percent of the market and bears that share of cost, which since the start of the reinsurance plan in 1995 ranged between 0 and 10 percent of sales.
In 1997, the Insurer analyzed Board of Registration of Medicine data and found that obstetrician/gynecologists were 4 percent of Massachusetts physicians, the same as its own proportion. 16 lower premiums. Physicians in the Insurer's highest rate group most likely pay at least as much as physicians with similar risk insured by CRICO, risk-retention groups, or offshore companies. Physicians choose unregulated insurance to pay less, or they bear insurance risk and administrative cost without benefit.
Two regulated insurers-Medical Protective and Connecticut Medical Insurance Company-developed niche markets by selling insurance to specialties that they believe are overcharged. In 2005, Medical Protective set lower rates than the Insurer: 14 percent or $5,850 less for orthopedists; and 11 percent or $11,602 less for obstetrician/gynecologists. 17 Yet we don't know what physicians actually paid, because discounts and surcharges are not disclosed. Also, these insurers might select physicians with below-average risk.
n Rate changes, 2005-2007. In 2006 the Insurer raised rates 5 percent. In 2007 no rates increased, and rates decreased for five high-risk specialties; OB/GYN manual rates decreased 10 percent.
Discussion
n Explaining perceptions of a premium crisis. Massachusetts premiums are probably higher than in all but the four or six states with higher median or mean settlement payments. Yet for most Massachusetts physicians, malpractice premiums are low and declined from 1990 to 2005. What accounts for the perception that premiums are higher than ever nationally and constitute a crisis?
Most observers do not adjust premium increases for inflation; focus on the highest-risk specialties, which are atypical; ignore discounts from manual rates; overlook previous premium declines, which offset recent increases; and base conclusions on unreliable data.
Most physicians are also unaware that premiums have cyclical rises and falls but change much less over the long term. 18 Premium cycles are partly due to the long time lag between when physicians purchase policies and insurers incur loss. This increases uncertainty and complicates accurate pricing of insurance risk. Market competition induces insurers to reduce premiums to increase their market share, until they revise upward predictions of future liabilities and reserve needs. Then, insurers increase premiums sharply to make up for liabilities incurred several years hence based on more optimistic estimates. A changing investment climate promotes premium cycles. As interest rates rise, so does insurer income from reserves. When interest rates decline, insurer investment income falls. 19 Market cycles result. In hard markets, insurers select risks, increase reserves, and raise premiums. During soft markets, insurers assume more risk, decrease reserves, and lower premiums.
Many observers assume that short-term premium increases are caused by the rising size and frequency of settlement payments. It is true that premiums reflect liability costs over the long term, but underwriting cycles explain short-term premium changes. Studies show that premiums rose in Texas in the 1980s and early 2000s because insurers changed long-term loss predictions and the investment climate soured, not because claims or awards increased in size or frequency. 20 n Effect of medical underwriting and competition. Medical underwriting explains the divergence among practice specialties as well as the wide premium variation within Tier 1. The Insurer used seven premium rate groups in 1975, eight in 1980, fifteen in 1990, and nineteen in 2005. After 1990, the Insurer extended underwriting within practice specialties through premium discounts and surcharges based on individual risk factors. It reduced premiums for lower-risk physicians and increased them for those with higher risks. Physicians within Tier 1's specialties paid identical premiums in 1990; by 2005, their premiums varied threefold. In 2005, 29 percent of obstetrician/gynecologists paid less than 1990 rates; 44 percent paid $8,700-$18,400 more, and 24 percent paid $28,150 or more than 1990 rates. Refining risk rating contributed greatly to the increased costs for high-risk obstetrician/gynecologists.
Health insurers that sell individual policies also use risk rating, charge steep premiums to high-risk individuals, or deny them coverage. However, most people obtain health insurance through employers, which spreads the risk across all employees and makes insurance affordable for high-risk individuals. An equivalent mechanism for malpractice insurance is known as enterprise liability. It shifts legal and financial responsibility from individual physicians to organizations such as hospitals. n Policy implications. If individual states have premium crises, Massachusetts should. However, it does not. Rather, its premiums reflect national and regional averages reported by the AMA surveys from 1970-2000. Instead of rising continually, premiums rose and fell cyclically. Most premiums were moderate in 2005 and lower than their 1990 peak for nearly all physicians. For the most frequently purchased type of policy and level of coverage, mean premiums in 2005 were $17,810. Only within the three highest-risk practice specialties (which included 8 percent of physicians in 1990 and 4 percent in 2005) were mean premiums higher in 2005 than in 1990. Even within these specialties, nearly one-third of physicians paid less than in 1990. Obstetrician/gynecologists paid the highest mean premiums in 2005: $85,979. Most likely, the Insurer's OB/GYN premiums are higher than the statewide mean. The Insurer lost market share since 1997 as obstetrician/gynecologists switched to competitors with lower rates.
Our study suggests that other states with high settlement payments and no caps are unlikely to have a premium crisis unless special factors explain why Massachusetts does not. Differences in insurers' underwriting practices, risk assessment, and state regulation could lower Massachusetts premiums. However, these are likely to produce only marginal or short-term savings. The Insurer, a mutual insurance company, might charge lower premiums than commercial insurers in other states. This, too, might produce only small premium differences. Moreover, the opposite occurred in Massachusetts: commercial insurers charged lower rates than the Insurer to highrisk physicians.
Nevertheless, in 2005 three Massachusetts practice specialties paid premiums greater than 5.3 times the mean for all physicians. Their premiums are outside the norm because of the size of their settlement payments. OB/ GYN premiums, for example, are driven by compensation for infants with disabilities requiring lifelong medical or custodial care. Physicians in these specialties who want to advocate for their patients should help change medical practice to reduce injuries and also seek a better means to compensate those injured, not cap damage awards for all patients.
Can practice changes reduce adverse events? Anesthesiology suggests that it can. Once a high-risk specialty, it reversed course in the 1980s. 21 American Society of Anesthesiology practice guidelines changed the standard of care. 22 Monitors that continuously check oxygen levels became standard, and fatalities fell between ten-and twentyfold in a decade. By cutting adverse events, physicians also greatly decreased malpractice lawsuits and premiums.
If injuries aren't due to negligence, alternative means of compensating injured patients make sense. One option-which would also provide financial relief for high-risk specialties-is for Congress to create a no-fault compensation system for certain patient injuries, such as infants born with permanent disabilities. There is precedent for such an approach. Virginia and Florida have selective no-fault insurance for certain birth-related injuries. 23 The AMA and others proposed selective no-fault compensation systems for obstetrics-related injuries or cerebral palsy. 24 Similarly, Congress created a no-fault vaccine injury compensation system. 25 Social Security, which insures certain permanent disabilities, could be expanded to cover birth-related disabilities. The Medicare statute could be amended to cover medical, nursing home, and home health care costs for all citizens with certain iatrogenic injuries.
Another option is to shift liability from physicians to hospitals for all adverse events that occur in hospitals-so-called enterprise liability. That would ensure patient compensa- tion and reduce the burden on all hospitalbased physicians. If institutions rather than physicians shouldered the burden for compensating injured patients, these expenses would be factored into their overhead costs and reflected in charges paid by insurers.
